Nevada Redistricting Proposals are a Recipe for Failure
From: John Bisognano
To: Interested Parties
Date: December 2023
Recently, two petitions were filed in Nevada that would create a flawed and overly political redistricting commission responsible for drawing and approving the state’s congressional and legislative maps. The two proposals are identical, except that one would require the existing maps, just approved in 2021, to be redrawn by December 23, 2027, while the other would be implemented following the next decennial census in 2030.
We oppose these proposals because both would create a commission that is far from independent, and a redistricting process that is doomed to fail from the start. The proposals are riddled with loopholes, including:
- Substantial involvement of politicians throughout the map drawing process; and
- A lack of important requirements to guarantee the commission can achieve its constitutional duty.
This attempt to create a redistricting commission responsible for map drawing is the latest example of how, when it comes to redistricting reform and independent commission design, the devil is in the details. Truly, not all redistricting reforms are created equal, and the redistricting commission currently being proposed in Nevada will do little to achieve a process Nevadans can be proud of. The following memorandum outlines these concerns.
1. The Proposals Allow For Substantial Involvement by Politicians Throughout the Map Drawing Process.
A truly independent commission must be free of political interference. As written, the Senate Majority Leader, the Senate Minority Leader, the Speaker of the Assembly, and the Assembly Minority Leader would each appoint one commissioner, for a total of four commissioners out of seven appointed by Nevada legislative leaders. These four politically-appointed commissioners would then appoint the final three commissioners. With no provisions requiring an application process or additional vetting of individuals selected to serve on the commission, the commissioner selection process creates an incentive for partisan actors to game the system.
Instead of creating a truly independent process for selecting and appointing commissioners, these proposals would leave a critical step in the formation of a redistricting commission in the hands of partisan politicians that could compromise the commission’s ability to act independent of the legislature or of partisan influence.
Additionally, the language as proposed lacks transparency measures. Commissioners wouldn’t be prohibited from privately communicating with one another or other members of the public during the map-drawing process. Combined with the role politicians play in the commissioner selection process, the conditions would be ripe for partisan actors to influence the commission’s work, impacting their independence and, potentially, their ability to come to consensus at critical decision-points.
2. The Proposals Lack Important Requirements to Guarantee the Commission Can Achieve Its Constitutional Duty.
Another critical ingredient for functional independent redistricting commissions is a mechanism or mechanisms to overcome impasse in the decision-making or map-approval process. The lack of an impasse requirement in the Nevada proposals makes an already weak process worse.
As written, the Nevada proposals lack any procedure to overcome an impasse that could very likely occur during the commissioner selection process, in the event that the first four commissioners — who are chosen by legislators — are unable to agree on the selection of the final three unaffiliated commissioners. The absence of a process to overcome disagreements by four politically-appointed commissioners in selecting the final three members — an entirely foreseeable scenario — would hinder the ability for the commission to form from the on-set.
Furthermore, the proposals don’t outline a process for the commission in the event that five out of the seven commissioners cannot agree on a final map for approval. The lack of a backup procedure in the event of such an impasse on map approval would very likely result in uncertainty as to how final maps should be developed and approved. Because of this, Nevadans could find themselves in the position where public input during the map drawing process is ultimately effectively ignored, silencing their voice in the process.
The absence of these important elements has the potential of rendering the proposed commission unable to complete its constitutional duty. Moreover, important questions about who might take the pen next in such a scenario remain unanswered.
Conclusion
The proposed commission reform in Nevada falls significantly short of establishing a process free of influence by politicians and a truly independent commission able to achieve its constitutional duty. It provides outsized opportunities for politicians and partisan actors to exploit what is being mischaracterized as an independent process, while lacking substantive provisions to ensure the commission is set up for success.
